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COOLING TIME - A DESIRABLE
TEST.- [Kentucky] The strict in-
structions and rulings of the courts
on the element of "cooling time"
in cases of homicide induced by
adequate provocation have resulted
in many unduly severe and unjust
punishments. Most courts say that
no matter how grievous the provo-
cation may have been, if there was
time for a reasonable man to cool
his passion the offense is murder;
whether or not the passion actually
did subside is immaterial. Nevada
v. Hall, 9 Nev. 58 (1893); Nowacryk
v. People, 139 Ill. 336, 28 N. E. 961
(1891); Ragland v. State, 125 Ala.
12, 27 So. 983 (1900); In Re Far-
ley, 3 Okla. Crim. 719, 101 Pac. 295
(1910); Holcomb v. State, 103 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 348, 281 S. W. 204
(1926).
The legislatures have realized
that a man greatly agitated and
excited by a grave provocation,
may attempt to "take the law into
his own hands," and have felt that
in the name of justice a less severe
punishment than that for murder
should be provided. Voluntary
manslaughter statutes have been
the result. The courts, however,
appear to have unnecessarily lim-
ited this legislative intent.
Exemplary of the majority ruling
limiting cooling time to that of a
reasonable man is the case of Peo-
ple v. Ashland, 20 Cal. App. 168,
128 Pac. 798 (1912), wherein a con-
viction for murder was affirmed
against a defendant who, informed
by his wife that she had twice com-
mitted adultery with deceased, the
first time under violence, searched
for deceased and shot him seven-
teen hours after he had been first
informed, a sufficient time to cool
said the court. Another court in
Commonwealth v. Moore, 2 Pa. 502
(1864), held that where the de-
fendant's wife confessed a few
hours before the homicide that she
had committed adultery with de-
ceased, there was no ground for
holding" that the offense was man-
slaughter rather than murder.
There had been ample time for re-
flection after the defendant learned
of the adultery An extreme case
is Collins v. Florida, 88 Fla. 578, 102
So. 880 (1924), where the deceased
made several improper proposals
to defendant's wife. To get away
from him defendant and wife
moved eighteen miles away. Fin-
ally, deceased visited the home of
defendant, forced the wife into his
car, drugged her and had inter-
course with her. Upon learning of
this incident, defendant searched
for deceased and killed him, several
hours later. The court, although
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not disturbing the jury verdict of
manslaughter, said, ". . but in
such case the slayer cannot take
time and deliberate upon the
wrong, and then act upon an im-
pulse to avenge the insult by taking
the life of the wrongdoer."
In the recent case of Golden v.
Commonwealth, ... Ky...., 121 S.
W. (2d) 21 (1938), it did not occur
to the defense attorney to request,
or to the trial court to give, an in-
struction on voluntary manslaugh-
ter, this failure to do so probably
being the result of the previous
strict interpretations of "cooling
time."
In that case the defendant was
found guilty of murder in the first
degree. A trifle more than a year
previous to the killing, the de-
ceased's brother had seduced and
gotten with child the appellant's
fifteen year old daughter. The af-
ternoon before the homicide the
deceased, while returning the bas-
tard child to the home of its
mother, wilfully made an indecent
exposure of his person before the
women in the house. Defendant's
efforts to stop such conduct re-
sulted only in jeering replies and
oaths from the deceased. Appellant
was so greatly excited over the de-
ceased's utter contempt for the
women of his family that he was
unable to sleep most of that night.
The next morning he shot deceased.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals
expressed its dissatisfaction with
the heavy penalty meted out, but
found itself handcuffed so it could
do nothing else but affirm. Evi-
dently the court believed that this
was not a place for an instruction
on voluntary manslaughter al-
though a conviction on that offense
would have been the answer to
what both the defense attorney and
the Court were striving for-a less
severe punishment.
The Court in State v. Holmes,
12 Wash. 169, 40 Pac. 735 (1895),
also applied the majority rule with
a great deal of hesitation. The de-
fendant, a weak colored boy was
assaulted in a most brutal and
cowardly manner by the deceased,
a large powerful white man, who
bragged that he intended to have a
"nigger" before the day was over.
As soon as the defendant was able
to break away from the deceased,
he procured a gun and returned
and shot him. The elapsed time
between the beating and defend-
ant's return was from ten to fifteen
minutes.
The Court said "this is a hard
case and the condition of the de-
fendant is touching; and whether
or not, if this court had sat as
jurors in this case, we would have
felt justified in returning a verdict
of murder in the first degree is
questionable . . . ." The Court
then went on to say, that the case
having been submitted to the jury
under proper instructions, and it
being a close question under the
facts, they would not disturb the
verdict. The trial court had in-
structed the jury not to consider
whether the defendant did cool his
passions but whether he had time
to cool them.
A much more satisfying and just
result was reached by the Mis-
souri Supreme Court in the case of
State v. Gruggin, 147 Mo. 39, 47 S.
W. 1058 (1898), by applying a lib-
eral interpretation of the "cooling
time" factor. In this case the de-
fendant was informed at nine
o'clock in the morning that his
young daughter had been raped by
the deceased, about a month pre-
viously. The defendant was deeply
affected by this incident, and at
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three o'clock that afternoon shot
the deceased. The trial judge
charged the jury that they should
find the defendant guilty of mur-
der, there being sufficient cooling
time. The Supreme Court re-
versed, saying a manslaughter
charge should have been given.
Wharton in his treatise on crim-
inal law (12 ed., Sec. 609) succinct-
ly states the more desirable view.
"Whether there has been cool-
ing time is eminently a question of
fact, varying with the particular
case and the condition of the party.
There are some provocations
which, with persons of even tem-
perament, lose their power in a few
moments; while there are others
which rankle in the breast for days
and even weeks, producing tempo-
rary insanity. Men's tempera-
ments, also, vary greatly as to the
duration of hot blood; and it must
be remembered that we must de-
termine the question of malice in
each case, not by the standard of
an ideal "reasonable man," but by
that of the party- to whom the
malice is imputed. Hence, whether.
there has been cooling time, so as
to impute to the defendant malice,
is to be decided not by an absolute
rule, but by the conditions of each
case."
Surely, the view as expressed by
Wharton and applied in State v.
Gruggin (supra) is much more in-
telligent and better serves the ends
of justice than does the view ap-





Upon conviction in the New
York State court for burglary, de-
fendant was sentenced as a second
offender by virtue of a prior con-
viction in a United States District
court in New York for uttering a
counterfeit federal reserve bank
note. The state court held that
the burglary was his second crime
because his first offense, uttering a
counterfeit bill, was punishable un-
der a state statute also. People v.
Fury, 18 N. E. (2d) 650, (N. Y.,
1939).
The habitual offender statute
under which the defendant was
sentenced, states that, "A person,
who, after having been once or
twice convicted within this state,
of a felony, of an attempt to com-
mit a felony, or, under the laws of
any other state, government, or
country, of a crime which, if com-
mitted within this state, would be
a felony, commits any felony,
within this state, is punishable up-
on conviction of such second or
third offense, as follows.. ." (ital-
ics supplied). N. Y. CoNsoL. LAws
(Baldwin, 1938), PENAL LAW, sec.
881.
This statute is representative of
the ambiguity which exists in the
habitual offender statute of many
states. (CoLo. STAT. ANN. (Michie,
1935) c. 550, see. 551, MINN. STAT.
(Mason, 1927) see. 9931-1, ORE.
CODE ANN. (1930) sec. 13-2801,
UTAH REV. STAT. ANN. (1933) sec.
103-1-18) "Within this state," may
be taken to mean, within the state
boundaries, as opposed to, within
the jurisdiction of the state courts.
In People v. Gutterson, 244 N. Y.
243, 155 N. E. 113 (1926), the am-
biguity in the wording of the stat-
ute was removed by qualifying it
through another of the state stat-
utes. The holding of that case was
that a prior conviction in a federal
court for using the mails to defraud
did not bar the defendant from
being sentenced under the indeter-
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minate sentence statute. This stat-
ute provided that, "a person never
before convicted of a crime pun-
ishable by imprisonment in d state
prison," shall receive an indeter-
minate sentence (italics supplied).
N. Y. CONSOL. LAWS (Baldwin,
1938), PENAL LAW, see. 2189.
The holding of the Gutterson
case left the possible scope of sen-
tencing under the habitual offender
statute to only those offenses,
"punishable by imprisonment in a
state prison." The principal case
extended the statute completely
over that scope by holding that the
prior conviction need not be in a
state court, providing only, that the
prior offense would have been a
felony if committed within the
jurisdiction of the state courts.
Other states having the same
type of ambiguity in their habitual
offender statute (supra), must in
the future face the same problem.
If there is no qualifying statute as
in New York, their courts may
have to decide on the merits of one
construction in preference to the
other, as a possible basis for indi-
cating legislative intent.
Convictions under jurisdictions
other than that of the state are of
two types: 1. Convictions under
the laws of the other states. 2.
Convictions under federal laws.
The state may legislate in any
field which a sister state may. Thus,
the laws of the principal state
would be a true standard of the
legislature's attitude as to the penal
nature of a prior offense committed
under the laws of another state.
This is not true in respect to
prior federal convictions. The prin-
cipal state is precluded from legis-
lating in most of the fields which
Congress acts. Only where there
are constitutional state statutes
giving concurrent jurisdiction in
respect to the particular type of
offense involved will the principal
state's laws be a valid standard.
But, under the broader construc-
tion of the statute, the standard is
expanded to include federal laws,
that is, within the state boundaries,
it covers the federal courts in the
state as well as the state courts.
Hence, any federal offense if com-
mitted within the state boundaries,
would be a felony in the federal
courts of the state, and fall within
the purview of the statute.
It might be said that the legis-
lature would not desire to have all
federal offenses deemed prior con-
victions. This may be answered
by pointing out that there is no bar
to excluding any offense they may
so desire by subsequent statutes.
The advantage of the broader in-
terpretation is the bringing of
federal offenses within the scope of
the state penal statutes indirectly,
which except in cases of concur-
rent jurisdiction statutes, could not
be done directly. Is it unreason-
able to infer that the statute was
worded with the intent to protect
the state from the habitual crim-
inal, who, though having been
convicted many times in the fed-
eral courts, is facing his first state
sentence?
The concurrent jurisdiction stat-
ute involved in the principal case
raises many other problems that as
yet have not been before the
courts. The defendant had com-
mitted the counterfeiting in New
York. Hence he may have been
tried and convicted under the New
York counterfeiting statute without
double jeapardy, United States V.
Lanza, 260 U. S. 377 (1922). The
question is then, do these two con-
victions for the same offense make
such an offender subject to the
second offender statute? Or, to
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carry the question one step fur-
ther, will a subsequent state con-
viction for another act subject him
to a sentence as third offender?
It would seem that under a liter-
al interpretation of the holding of
the principal case, the answer to
both questions would be in the af-
firmative.
It would seem more reasonable,
however, that the legislative intent
to get at the habitual criminal
would best be served by judging
the prior offenses by the number of
criminal acts perpetrated, as op-
posed to the number of convictions.
JACK JACOBS.
I".
Upon prosecution for murder,
defendant was convicted of man-
slaughter. Previously he had been
convicted of grand larceny in Ore-
gon, and later was convicted of
the crime of "stealing an automo-
bile" in Canada. Now the State
successfully obtained his conviction
as a third offender under the
Louisiana multiple offender statute.
Upon' appeal, the conviction was
amended, finding the accused guilty
as a second offender. Held: the
Canadian offense would not have
been a felony in Louisiana so can-
not be considered in determining
the number of previous offenses
committed, State v. O'Day, 185 So.
290 (La. 1938).
The Canadian statute under
which the defendant was previously
convicted provides in part, "Theft
is committed when the offender
moves the thing or causes it to
move or to be moved, or begins to
cause it to become movable, with
intent to steal it," Dom. Crim.
Code, Art. 347.
From this provision it is obvious
that asportation is no longer nec-
essary to the crime of theft in Can-
ada, and it has been so held; Hen-
derson v. Northwestern Mutual
Fire Ass'n, 34 B. C. R. 411, 43 C.
C. C. 217 1 D. L. R. 339 (1925).
Thus, this Canadian statute covers
both the common law larceny when
asportation is necessary and a new
crime of theft. In the instant case
the court held that the crime ol
stealing an automobile, with no as-
portation, a felony under the Can-
adian code did not amount to a
felony under the Louisiana code of
Criminal Procedure (Crim. Stat.
Ann., 1932, Ch. 7, "Habitual Crim-
inals," Art. 709) which provides
that "Any person who, after having
been convicted, within this State,
of a felony, or of an attempt to
commit a felony, or who, after hav-
ing been convicted under the laws
of any other State, government, or
county, of a crime which, if com-
mitted within this State, would be
a felony, commits any felony, with-
in this State, upon conviction of
such second offense, shall be pun-
ished as follows: . . ."
California, New York, Texas,
Michigan, Colorado, and Oregon
among others have similar habitual
criminal statutes; Cal. Penal Code
(Deering, 1937) sec. 644, N. Y.
Penal Law, sec. 1942, Tex. Ann.
Penal Code (Vernon, 1925) Art.
63, Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) sec.
17, 339, Colo. Stat. Ann. Ch. 48,
sec 551, Oregon Code Ann. (1930)
sec. 13-2802. In New York, at-
tempts to commit felonies within a
statute providing for punishment
for fourth or subsequent convic-
tions include attempts which are
no more than misdemeanors, while
the word felony, as used in the
same statute, refers only to crimes
(including attempts) which are
strictly of the grade of felony as
defined by section 2 of the Penal
Law, Stauber v. Larkin, 271 N. Y.
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S. 305 (1934). Therefore, under
the New York interpretation, the
defendant in the instant case, if
his Canadian crime were declared
an attempt in Louisiana (whether
misdemeanor or felony), would
have been found guilty as a third
offender.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana
interpreted their statute strictly,
however, allowing no deviation
from the formal tenor of the words.
Thus defendant was freed of the
third offender charge because the
Canadian crime did not amount to
a felony in Louisiana. Owing to
the fact that there is no crime of
attempt to commit larceny in
Louisiana, this defendant would
have been guilty of nothing under
that state's laws.
An attempt is an intended ap-
parent unfinshed crime. Graham
v. People, 181 Ill. 477, 155 N. E. 179
(1899). The question of whether
an attempt has been made to com-
mit a crime is determined solely
by the condition of the actor's mind
and his conduct in the attempted
commission of his design, People v.
Moran, 123 N. Y. 254, 25 N. E. 412
(1890). People v. Jaffee, 98 N. Y.
S. 486, affirmed in 185 N. Y. 497
(1906). To constitute attempt to
commit larceny there must be an
overt act which if not intercepted
by some intervening cause would
culminate in larceny, People v. Ed-
wards, 79 Cal. App. 514, 249 Pac.
1090, 1091 (1926). The above def-
initions and limitations of attempt
were fully satisfied by the act of
the defendant in the principal case
when he got into the automobile,
threw the ignition switch on, and
stepped on the starter. His design
to steal the automobile was frus-
trated by an intervening agency,
a policeman, but the turning of the
switch certainly was an overt act,
which if not stnnred by an outside
agency would have culminated in
the completed crime.
Therefore the defendant's act in
Canada, although not a felony in
Louisiana by this court's interpre-
tation, actually was, or would have
been an attempt to commit the fel-
ony of grand larceny, and would
have resulted in the conviction of
O'Day as a third offender, in any
state wherein an attempt to com-
mit grand larceny is punishable, if
coupled with the New York con-
struction of the statute. This hi-
atus in the Louisiana law results
in a discriminatory inconsistency
as attempts to commit rape, to steal
automobile parts, and the like are
made criminal acts by statute, and
thus, under the New York rule,
would subject perpetrators of such
acts in other states to the habitual
offender statute if they subsequent-
ly committed a crime in Louisiana.
But an attempt to steal an automo-
bile as in the instant case is not an
offence within the purview of the
statute. Perhaps the legislature





city mayor and chief officer of pub-
lic safety, was charged with mis-
conduct and negligence in office for
having willfully and knowingly
neglected his official duty by taking
no action against gambling houses
and bawdy houses which he knew
to be operating in the city. The
indictment omitted to include exact
information concerning the loca-
tion of the houses or the names of
their operators, merely identifying
the gambling houses as located "in
certain buildings situated upon
certain streets and highways of
said city, known and designated as
Main Street near the intersection
of Seventh Street, the exact nu-
merous street locations being to
this Grand Jury unknown," and
using similar wording in describing
the location of the brothels. In the
trial court, there was a judgment
sustaining a motion to quash the
indictment; upon appeal by the
state the judgment was affirmed.
The indictment was defective be-
cause too indefinite in not describ-
ing with reasonable accuracy the
location of any one of the houses
or describing any individuals con-
nected with them. State v. Maher,
... Mo ... , 124 S. W. (2d) 679
(1939).
At common law criminal indict-
ments were required to conform
to very strict standards both as to
the form of indictment and sub-
stance of the charge therein. But
by the modern interpretation, no
indictment is held to be insufficient
by reason of imperfection of form
alone, if the substantial rights of
the defendant are not prejudiced
Still, the indictment returned by
the grand jury is required to iden-
tify with certainty the charge
against the defendant. The sixth
amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution and most state constitu-
tions contain provisions to this ef-
fect. Section 22 of Article II of
the Constitution of the State of
Missouri applies in the instant case:
"In criminal prosecutions the ac-
cused shall have the right . . . to
demand the nature and cause of
the accusation . . . ." The courts
have generally construed such con-
stitutional provisions to mean that
an indictment is sufficiently certain
if it so identifies the charge against
the defendant that he is clearly
apprised of the offense alleged and
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can prepare his defense, if it will
guide the court in deciding ques-
tions of the admissibility of evi-
dence and in pronouncing judgment
in the event of conviction, and if
defendant's conviction or acquittal
on this charge will be a bar to an-
other prosecution for the same of-
fense. Mundy v. Commonwealth,
161 Va. 1049, 171 S. E. 691 (1933),
City of Seattle v. Proctor, 183
Wash. 299, 48 P. (2d) 241 (1935),
People v. Farson, 244 N. Y. 413,
155 N. E. 724 (1927).
As Bishop points out in his Crim-
inal Procedure, volume II, sections
517 et seq., these requirements for
certainty in the indictment are
grounded in sound reason. Every
defendant is innocent in the eyes
of the law until convicted, and
should be given full and fair
notice of what is charged against
him so that he may have every
chance to prove his innocence to
the court. He can know only what
appears in the indictment, so that
instrument should allege every fact
which is material to the proceed-
ings.
The indictment in the instant
case was based upon Section 3950,
Rev. Stats. Mo. 1929, which reads,
in part: "Every officer or person
holding any trust or appointment,
who shall be convicted of any will-
ful misconduct or misdemeanor in
office, or neglect to perform any
duty enjoined on him by law,
where no speciil provision is made
for the punishment of such mis-
demeanor, misconduct, or negli-
hence, shall be punished . .. ."
But an indictment for a statutory
offense which merely follows the
language of the statute is not good
unless it charges the offense with
precision and certainty, and leaves
no room for doubt of the exact of-
fense intended to be charged.
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Jarl v. United States, 19 F. (2d)
891 (1927). It is permissible under
some circumstances to allege in an
indictment that some facts are un-
known to the grand jury, but this
is only justifiable on grounds of
reasonable necessity-which does
not include a case such as this
where the grand jury leaves out
facts which they could have ascer-
tained and which were essential to
the charge made. State v. Stowe,
132 Mo. 199, 33 S. W. 799 (1896).
Though the indictment in the pres-
ent case used the words of the stat-
ute it was nevertheless not suffi-
ciently specific, for it described the
houses, knowledge of which de-
fendant is alleged to possess, in
such ambiguous and indefinite
terms that defendant could prepare
virtually no defense. Further, be-
cause of the large and vaguely de-
scribed area referred to in the in-
dictment, it would be difficult to
plead defendant's acquittal or con-
viction in bar of future proceedings
of the same sort which might be
based on the identical fact situation.
Finally, the judge and jury could
not tell whether the evidence pro-
duced at the trial proved what the
indictment so indistinctly alleged.
This case clearly falls within the
rule requiring certainty of indict-
ment, and the rule is supported
here by reason as well as precedent.
In similar cases charging mal-
feasance of public officers in neg-
lecting to act against known gam-
bling houses and houses of pros-
titution, indictments have been
held sufficient which identified the
houses by street and number.
State v. Castle, 75 N. J. L. 187, 66
Atl. 1059 (1907), People v. Herlihy,
66 App. Div. 534, 73 N. Y. S. 236
(1901), State v. Boyd, 196 Mo. 52,
94 S. W. 536 (1906).
An indictment charging this
same offense of official misconduct
has been held sufficiently definite
which alleged that the mayor, cap-
tain of police, and chief of police
unlawfully conspired and agreed
with a certain named person, op-
erator of houses of ill fame, to al-
low the operation of houses of pros-
titution "at various places in the
city of Hamtramck." People v.
Tenerowicz et al., 266 Mich. 276,
253 N. W. 296 (1934).
The particularity required in an
indictment for malfeasance in office
depends of course upon the nature
of the exact misconduct charged.
In Turner v. State, ... Ga. ... , 199
S. E. 837 (1938), transferred 185
Ga. 432, 195 S. E. 431 (1938), the
defendant and another city police-
man were indicted for accepting a
bribe from a certain named person
to refrain from arresting persons
unknown to the grand jurors for
violating the lottery law, and for
furnishing police protection to such
persons. It would at first glance
seem that this indictment was in-
sufficient for not naming the per-
sons conducting the lottery nor
specifying what kind of lottery was
conducted; but the indictment was
rightly held sufficiently definite
since the nature of the lottery and
the operator's name were merely
incidental to the bribery charge.
Another indictment was held ade-
quate which charged a commis-
sioner of city works generally with
conspiring with a certain named
person to willfully omit, neglect,
and violate his duty as commis-
sioner. In addition, five specific
acts in furtherance of the conspira.
cy were listed, with the time and
place and the name of the city's
contractor upon whom, according
to the plot, tribute was to be levied
by the conspirators. This was held
sufficiently to individuate the of-
fense charged. People v. Willis et
al., 158 N. Y. 392, 53 N. E. 29(1899).
An unusual case in which a sur-
prisingly indefinite indictment was
upheld as valid was Castle v. Com-
monwealth, 232 Ky. 561, 24 S. W.
(2d) 298 (1930). There the in-
dictment charged that a constable
took money from "various and
divers persons whose names are
unknown to the grand jury" for
the purpose of preventing their
prosecution, "thereby obstructing
public justice, amd violating the
oath of his office." If the charge
was true, this was clearly an of-
fense under the Kentucky statutes.
A bill of particulars was filed which
gave in detail a particular transac-
tion in which the constable ac-
cepted a bribe. Although the orig-
inal indictment was couched in
general terms, the court said it was
definite enough and "the filing of
the bill of particulars did not cure
a defective indictment, but only
aided a good one." This is a sin-
gular decision, however, with
which most courts would probably
not agree.
The courts, in order to protect
public officers from indefinite and
ambiguous charges of neglect of
their official duty, have generally
inspected indictments very closely
to insure that they are sufficiently
complete in their charges. It would
seem that groups attempting to re-
form their city governments will
need more thatn general informa-
tion, for the grand jury must in-
clude in the indictment definite and
specific instances of malfeasance in
order to sustain a charge of mis-
conduct in office.
JAMES CLEMENT.
OPTIONAL, ALTERNATIVE, AND CON-
DITIONAL SENTENCS.-[New York]
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Defendant plead guilty to a charge
of speeding in violation of a city
ordinance. The court sentenced
him to pay a $60 fine. However
the sentence was to be suspended
entirely if the defendant left his
driver's license with the court for
a period of 60 days, or suspended
in part if a public liability insur-
ance policy was filed with the
court. On appeal to the county
court it was held: in criminal
prosecution, the court must deter-
mine the sentence and has no
power to make it optional with the
defendant; a sentence must be cer-
tain and definite and, in absence of
statute authorizing it, must not be
in the alternative. Nevertheless
the conviction was sustained, the
county court reducing the fine to
$10 and striking off the conditions
imposed. City of Rochester v.
Newton, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 441 (1938).
The main objection was lodged
against the public liability condi-
tion. Section 2188 of the Penal
Code provides that on conviction
the court may suspend sentence or
impose sentence and suspend the
execution of judgment. Under this
section, if sentence is imposed and
execution of judgment is suspended,
the authority of the court is con-
fined to suspension of the entire
sentence, not merely part of it.
Ex Parte Kuney, 5 N. Y. S. (2d)
644 (1936). By permitting the
cost of the policy to be deducted
from the fine, the court suspended
only part of the sentence, con-
trary to the rule in the Kuney case.
Even assuming this statute non-
existent, the court admitted no
power to require the defendant to
take out an insurance policy, for
the legislature had not enacted a
law compelling automobile liability
insurance. It has been often held
that the diminution or termination
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of the sentence may not be condi-
tioned on acts which the criminal
court could not directly order the
convicted defendant to perform.
Smith v. Barrow, 21 Ga. App. 145,
94 S. E. 860 (1917); State v. Per-
kins, 82 N. C. 68 (1880); Ray v.
State, 40 Ga. App. 145, 149 S. E. 64
(1929). In a minority of states,
however, trial courts are consid-
ered to have inherent power to sus-
pend execution of sentence on any
reasonable condition prescribed.
Rayland v. State, 55 Fla. 157, 46 So.
724 (1928); Scriggs v. City of
North Little Rock, 179 Ark. 200, 14
S. W. (2d) 1112 (1929). Under
most statutory systems the crim-
inal courts are restricted to penal-
ties and procedure set out in the
statutes and have no inherent
power to suspend on condition. In
re Mills, 135 U. S. 263, (1889);
Medjourous v. State, 240 Ohio App.
146, 156 N. E. 918 (1924).
The county court was greatly
alarmed at the defendant being
given an option to fix the amount
of his sentence, or being permitted
alternative courses of conduct.
Sentences giving a defendant an
option or alternative course of
conduct have long been con-
demned. "One of the glories of the
common law was the fixed charac-
ter of its criminal punishment." 4
Blackstones Comm. 378; 1 Chitty
Cr. Law (4th Am. Ed. 184) 701.
"Term of imprisonment or the
amount of the fine may'not depend
on future contingency." See Holt
K. B. 320 (1700). Per Holt, C. J.,
"a fine ought to be absolute and
not conditional." "It is fundamen-
tal law that the sentence in a crim-
inal case must be definite and cer-
tain." Bishop, Crim. Proc. No. 1309;
12 Cyc. 779 and cases cited. All of
this terminology has formed a "se-
ductive cliche" that still entraps
judges, as is evidenced in the in-
stant case.
Many states have abrogated the
common law rule, authorizing al-
ternative sentence by statute, such
as, Illinois-Smith-Hurd Stats. c.
38, Secs. 192, 93; Montana-Rev.
Codes 1921 See. 12069; Missouri-
Rev. Stats. 1909 Sec. 8315. Section
483 of the N. Y. Code of Crim.
Proc. permits trial courts to pre-
scribe "such terms and conditions
as they may deem best," but, "with
the consent of the defendant." No
doubt Sec. 483 is typical of the lan-
guage in state statutes which do
authorize conditional sentences.
An exception is Ill. Rev. Stats.
(Cahill 1937) c. 38, Sec. 812 et seq.,
where all authorized conditions are
outlined and specifically enumer-
ated. These statutes would appear
to provide trial courts with a way
to evade the 'seductive cliches' of
the common law.
Perhaps the statutes like that of
New York have given the courts
too much discretionary power. Al-
though the consent of the defend-
ant is necessary for a valid sus-
pension on condition, the defendant
has little choice but to acquiesce.
The fact that defendant in the prin-
cipal case objected and appealed
s indeed unusual. The number of
appeals in this type of case is quite
negligible, since the reward of a
light or suspended sentence is a
strong inducement to the convicted
defendant to accede to any sug-
gestion by the court. The Illinois
statute which authorizes only the
imposition of enumerated condi-
tions may be the best solutiQn. For
without some statutory check on
the procedure, the defendant, who
often cannot appeal from the order
and conviction once he has ac-
cepted the suspension (on the the-
ory that the suspension is not a
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final judgment from which an ap-
peal can be taken-Walther v.
State, 179 Ind. 565, 101 N. E. 1005
(1913)) is subject to the will of
the trial court. This gives appel-
late courts practically no oppor-
tunity to prevent "illegal practices"
on the part of trial courts who
abuse their discretionary power.
Whatever may be the extent of
so-called "illegal practices," they
have been condemned as such quite
ineffectively by the appellate
courts. In Medjourous v. State,
supra, the court said, "the prac-
tices which have grown up among
trial courts in this state of remit-
ting parts of fines which have been
imposed, or permitting the accused
to serve less time than provided by
law, or serve none at all . . . are
illegal, contrary to public policy,
and inimical to the public good.
These practices are also a reflec-
tion upon the integrity of the
courts, create a distrust in the
minds of the people, establish a
lack of uniformity throughout the
state in the imposition of sentence
for the same offense."
However trial courts, attempting
to effect a complete if rough jus-
tice in situations involving non-
capital offenses, have tempered the
rigidity of the direct sentencing
power resulting from these restric-
tions "with all sorts of mitigating
devices . . . running through the
whole course of a prosecution."
See Pound, Foreword: Predictabil-
ity in the Administration of Crim-
inal Justice (1928) 42 Harv. L.
Rev. 297. Some of these trial court
practices may be technically ille-
gal, others are merely opportune
utilizations of discretionary pro-
cedure, much of which has sur-
vived from the day when common
law courts could grant neither an
appeal nor a new trial.
Despite the legalistic arguments
.pro and con, the use of such de-
vices by the courts is an informal
attempt to approximate the aims
of criminologists in recent years.
The natural reaction from the fu-
tile, cast iron, prescribed penal
treatment characteristic of the last
century was a movement for the
development of individualized pe-
nal treatment, which was to make
the punishment fit the criminal
rather than the punishment fit the
crime. It may be that the reaction
will lead to a thorough reorganiza-
tion of our system by which the
treatment to be accorded all of-
fenders would be conferred on a
specially qualified tribunal. Until
that happens the real problem that
remains is devising appropriate
machinery for the administration
of these minor offenses.
HOWARD A. MCKEE.
POWER OF COURTS TO VACATE
SENTENCE AFTER PARTIAL ExEcu-
TION AND IMPOSE A NEW SENTENCE
INCREASING THE PUNISHMENT. -
[Florida] After conviction on
charge of larceny and sentence
thereunder for 6 months in the
county jail, petitioner by his
physician came before the court
asking removal * from jail to
save petitioner's life for he was
suffering from a severe attack
of pneumonia. The court vacated
sentence and discharged petitioner.
At a subsequent term of court pe-
titioner was sentenced for 2 years
under the previous conviction. Pe-
titioner now alleges that because of
partial execution of the first sen-
tence the court had no power to
revoke it, and thus the sentence
imposed at the later date was void.
The Supreme Court held that as
a rule a court is without power to
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set aside a criminal judgment after
it has been partly satisfied by the
defendant and impose a new and
different sentence increasing the
punishment, even at the same term
of court at which the original judg-
ment was imposed. But, where the
sentence is vacated during the
same term of court at defendant's
request, and the proposition of im-
posing a new sentence is deferred
to a subsequent term of court, to
which the case'is considered pend-
ing, the court may at the subse-
quent term of court impose a new
sentence, even increasing the pun-
ishment, upon the original convic-
tion. The court then interpreted
the representations of the physx-
cian as equivalent to a motion by
the defendant to vacate the sen-
tence and held that, as a conse-
quence of that motion, the second
sentence was not void and could
not be attacked by habeas corpus
proceedings. Smith v. Brown, 185
So. 732 (1939). The holding was
directly supported by another Flor-
ida case. Rhoden v. Chapman, 127
Fla. 9, 172 'So. 56 (1937).
Whether, in absence of statute, a
court may suspend the pronounce-
ment of a sentence to a subsequent
term is a hurdle that must be
jumped before dealing with the
power of the court to vacate, dur-
ing term of imposition, a sentence
partially satisfied and impose a
greater one at a subsequent term.
In cases where the pronouncement
of the sentence is delayed for an
indefinite time, or dependent on
the defendant's good behavior, the
courts have rather consistently
held that such suspension deprived
the court of jurisdiction to impose
a sentence at a later term. The
basis of these holdings is that the
court is infringing upon the execu-
tive power of pardoning. State v.
Sapp, 87 Kan. 740, 125 Pac. 78
(1912); Grundel v. People, 33 Colo.
191, 79 Pac. 1022 (1906); People v.
Allen, 155 Ill. 61, 39 N. E. 568,
(1895). Contra: Ex Parte, Wil-
liams, 26 Fla. 310, 5 So. 833 (1890);
Sylvester v. State, 65 N. H. 193, 20
Atl. 954 (1889). Hawever, when
the pronouncement of sentence is
unconditionally suspended for a
definite time and for some good
cause incident to the administra-
tion of justice by the court, the
courts have consistently held that
sentence may be imposed at a sub-
sequent term. For, in these cases,
the purpose is not to pardon or
parole the defendant; but merely
to enable the court to more justly
exercise its power of imposing sen-
tence. Miner v. United States, 244
Fed. 422 (C. C. A. 3d, 1917); In Re
St. Hilaire, 101 Me. 522, 64 Atl. 882
(1906); State v. Ray, 50 Iowa 520
(1879); 25 Harv. L. Rev. 739; 12
Col. L. Rev. 543. Thus, in the in-
stant case, as the deferring of the
pronouncement of sentence to a
subsequent term was in no manner
indefinite or an attempt to exercise
the executive pardoning power, the
validity of the subsequent sentence
cannot be challenged merely be-
cause it was imposed at a later
term.
It is generally held that the
judgments, decrees, and orders of
a court are within the control of
the court during the term at which
they were made and may be
amended or altered by the court
during term. 2 Co. Lit. 1st Am.
Ed., See. 438; State v. White, 3 N.
J. M. 1016, 130 Atl. 470 (1925). To
this rule there is a well recognized
limitation; namely, that a court
may not vacate the old sentence
and increase the punishment after
part of the old sentence has been
executed. 44 A. L. R. 1203; 8 R. C.
L. 244; Wharton, Criminal Plead-
ing and Practice, 9th ed, Sec. 913.
The reason for this rule is often
said to be that once the prisoner
begins to 'serve his sentence the
court loses its power over his des-
tiny and has no more jurisdiction
over the case. Brown v. Rice, 57
Me. 55 (1869); People v. Meservey,
76 Mich. 223, 42 N. W. 1133 (1889).
Thus the old sentence is void and
the first one still remains in effect.
Brown v. Rice, supra; State v. Can-
non, 11 Ore. 312, 2 Pac. 191 (1884);
Turner v. State, 31 S. W. (2d) 809
(Tex. Civ. App. 1930); In Re Sul-
livan, 3 Cal. App. 193, 84 Pac. 781
(1906). However, the underlying
reason for this generally accepted
limitation to the court's control
over its sentences is that to allow
the defendant to suffer twice under
the same verdict and conviction
would be to put him in double
jeopardy. Ex Parte Lange, 85 U. S.
163, 173 (1874).
That double jeopardy is the only
fundamental reason why the court
cannot set aside its judgment after
partial execution was also pointed
out in a later United States Su-
preme Court decision in which the
court held that a court could va-
cate a sentence and mitigate the
punishment after partial execution
of the original sentence. United
States v. Benz, 282 U. S. 304, 307
(1931); Note 19 Geo. L. J. 365;
Note 15 Minn. L. Rev., p. 828.
However, many states have also
denied their courts the power to
mitigate punishment after partial
execution of the sentence, on three
different grounds, namely: (1) it
is an infringement on the pardon.-
ing power of the executive; (2) it
is prohibited by statutory restric-
tions; (3) the practice of allowing
the court to alter a sentence after
partial execution would be de-
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structive to the object of punish-
ment, namely, the reformation of
the offender, as his term of punish-
ment would always be an uncer-
tainty to him. People v. Williams,
352 Ill. 227, 185 N. E. 598 (1933);
Com. v. Mayloy, 57 Pa. 281 (1868);
Brabandt v. Com., 157 Ky. 130, 162
S. W. 786 (1914); 15 Minn. L. Rex.
828; 19 Geo. L. J. 365; 22 J. C. L.
591.
It is logical to say that in those
jurisdictions where the court is not
allowed to VJacate a sentence par-
tially served, on motion of defend-
ant and during the same term of
court, and impose a lighter sen-
tence because of any of the rea-
sons above given, they would not
be allowed to vacate the old sen-
tence and impose a new one inflict-
ing a greater punishment, even on
motion of the defendant to vacate
the old sentence. But, what would
be the action of those courts that
recognize that the foundation of the
rule is the double jeopardy in
which defendant is placed, and that
have no statutes on the subject?
Would they, as the Florida court
did in the instant case, hold that
the defendant had waived his right
not to be placed in double jeopardy
by moving for the old sentence to
be vacated; and, consequently, the
court, under its common law power
to alter sentences during term time,
could impose a sentence inflicting
greater punishment on the defend-
ant?
In the case of Emerson v. Boyles,
170 Ark. 621, 280 S. W. 1005 (1926),
the defendant, after partial execu-
tion, was by order of the court,
and with full approval and on mo-
tion of defendant, to be released
on his good behavior. The Su-
preme Court of the state held that
the trial court had no power to
authorize the release: "for the rea-
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son that to permit the judgment to
be set aside and another sentence
to be imposed some time in the fu-
ture, after the first sentence had
been partially executed, would, in
effect put the defendant in jeopary
twice for the same offense." Here,
although it may be questioned
whether the mere putting the de-
fendant in a position where his
punishment may later be increased
is to place him in double jeopardy,
it is clear that the court does not, in
any manner, consider the consent
of the defendant to the vacating of
the original sentence as a waiver
of his right not to be placed in
double jeopardy.
However, assuming that one may
waive his right not to have pun-
ishment already partly executed
be increased by the court, can a
motion to vacate the sentence be
considered as a waiver of that
right? The increasing of the sen-
tence, that is the infliction of the
new increased sentence, is the
double jeopardy, not the vacating
of the old sentence. Benz v. United
States, supra; Ex Parte Lange, su-
pra; In Re Brittain, 93 N. C. 587
(1885). Consequently, it seems to
be a frank contradiction of facts
to contend that a person has
waived his right not to be placed in
double jeopardy by moving for
a sentence to be vacated when it is
not the vacating of the sentence
that constitutes the double jeop-
ardy, but the later imposition of
the new sentence increasing the
punishment.
JOHN OVERBECK.
